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McDonough and Epstein: Attorney Conduct

REGULATING ATTORNEY CONDUCT:
SPECIFIC STATUTORY SCHFMS V. GENERAL
REGULATORY GUIDELINES
Chris G. McDonough and Michael L. Epsteine
INTRODUCTION

A long long time ago in a land not so far away, there were only
general guidelines to regulate attorney conduct. Attorneys were
guided in their conduct by tenets which were so general that they

merely stated what attorney. conduct should be, while in no way
showing the individual lawyer the way in which to attain those
goals. However, modem regulatory schemes are developing a
more statutory emphasis.
The modern-trend towards specific statutory rules to control
attorney conduct conflicts with traditional notions yet is viewed
by nmany as a necessity due to the changing nature of the practice
of law. This article will look at the evolution of the current New
York Lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility, and examine
modern attorney regulatory codes in light of the apparent conflict
between the traditional method of regulating via exhoratory ideals
and the modern trend towards specificity.
I. HISTORY
The New York State Code of Professional Responsibility was
born a very different creature than it is today. Its infancy was a
series of ideas developed as lectures by Judge George Sharswood
which were published as ProfessionalEthics in 1854.1 The ideas

* Chris G. McDonough is a 1988 graduate of Touro (cum laude), who is
presently Assistant Counsel to the Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial
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expressed in those lectures prompted the creation of the Alabama
Code of Ethics in 1887; the first attorney ethics regulatory
2
scheme in the country.
The adolescence of the modern Code was spent as The ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, 3 first adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908. These Canons consisted of thirty-two
expressions of ethical ideals, often set forth in vague and
inconclusive terms. These Canons were, at best, a general
embodiment of the exemplar of professionalism, with little
substantive content. 4 The Canons were repeatedly altered and
edited over the next sixty-two years.
From 1964 to 1970 attorney regulation experienced extreme
scrutiny and rapid growth. The President of the American Bar
Association appointed the Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards [hereinafter The Wright Committee] on August
14, 1964, to recommend changes to the Canons. 5 That committee
found the Canons to be: incomplete; in need of clarification;
impractical for enforcement purposes; insufficient as a guiding
and teaching tool; and not up to the challenges of a more
complex legal community and society. 6 As a result, in 1969 the
District. Mr. McDonough frequently writes and lectures on the subject of
professional ethics.
Michael L. Epstein is a 1993 graduate of Ohio Northern University College
of Law, with an LL.M in taxation from the Georgetown University Law
Center. Mr. Epstein is an attorney with the office of the Grievance Committee
for the Tenth Judicial District.
The views expressed by the authors are their personal opinion only, and
should not be construed as policy of either the Grievance Committee or the
Appellate Division, Second Department.

I. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILImy XV (Am. B.
Found. 1979) (citing Preface to 1969 Final Draft of the Code of Professional
Responsibility).
2. Id.
3. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs app. C at 309 (1953).
4. Id. For example, "[a] contract for a contingent fee .... should be
reasonable under all circumstances of the case.... but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." Id. at 313.
5. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, XV (Am. B.
Found. 1979).
6. Id.
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ABA adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective
January 1, 1970. 7 It is from this document that our modem New
York Code evolved.
H. THE ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
The Wright Committee cleverly crafted the ABA Code in three
parts; the Canons, the Disciplinary Rules, and the Ethical
Considerations. The New York Code retains this format to date.
The Canons reflected the early advisory ideals of Judge
Sharswood. "The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers.... They embody the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules
are derived." 8 It must be noted that while the Canons may be
mere vestigial reminders of the provenance of the Code, they are
nonetheless a strong comment that general statements of ideals
are not only proper, but are an essential ingredient in a modem
regulatory scheme. 9
One of the first disciplinary cases to clearly comment on the
necessity of generalized attorney regulation came out of the
Supreme Court for the Territory of Minnesota. In Ex Parte
Secombe, 10 the Court wrote that "it is difficult, if not impossible,
to enumerate and define, with legal precision, every offence for
which an attorney or counsellor ought to be removed."In
But enumerate they did. The Wright Committee created the
Disciplinary Rules which were much more specific than the
7. Adopted by the New York State Bar Association January 1, 1970, and
promulgated as joint rules of the four Appellate Divisions on September 1,
1970.

8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMHTY,

preliminary

statement (Final Draft 1969).
9. See TE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIHrr: NEw
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION preliminary statement (as amended July
1994).
10. 19 HOW. 9 (1856).
11. Id. atl4.
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Canons and which set forth the minimum standard below which
the conduct of attorneys must not fall. 12 The Code contemplated
disciplinary action for conduct which failed to rise to this
minimum mandatory level..
While these references to "mandatory minimums" and
"disciplinary action" granted the Disciplinary Rules a clear force
of law, the drafters did not intend for the Disciplinary Rules to be
the last nor the only word on required conduct. The Wright
Committee also formulated Ethical Considerations. 13 The Ethical
Considerations were described as inspirational in character,
which in light of the "mandatory" fiat given the Disciplinary
Rules, appeared to give the Ethical Considerations little hope of
commanding respect.
However, the Wright Committee desired all three parts of the
Code to be interdependent. In the final draft of the ABA Code,
and in the present New York State Bar Association publication of
the New York Code, 14 the Preliminary Statement notes that the
Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules together
12. MODEL

CODE

OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

preliminary

statement (Final Draft 1969). See, e.g., DR 1-102 which states in pertinent
part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
Id.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). See, e.g.,
EC 6-1 which states:
Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with
competence and proper care in representing clients. He should strive to
become and remain proficient in his practice and should accept
employment only in matters which he is or intends to become competent
to handle.
Id.
14. THE LAWYER's CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: NEW YORK
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ( as amended July 14. 1994).
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define the conduct the public has a right to expect. "An enforcing
agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive
guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in
the objectives reflected in the Ethical Considerations. " 15 In her
fine article on the 1990 amendments to the New York Code,
Marjorie Gross points out that despite only adopting the
Disciplinary Rules, the courts of this State have shown a
willingness to discipline based upon violations of an Ethical
Consideration or a Canon. 16
The plain language of the Preliminary Statement demonstrates
that the three parts of the Code were intended to work together to
guide attorneys in their ethical obligations. 1 7 The Canons set
forth the general ideals while the Ethical Considerations inform
the mandatory Disciplinary Rules and expand their scope.
Although our New York Code remains akin to its ABA
progenitor, the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility has, subsequent to its adoption in New York,
developed atypically to its ancestor. It has taken on a distinct
flavor of its own, while at the same time remaining true to.the
Wright Committee's intent to create an elastic document for the
changing world of law. That intent was recognized and reinforced
by New York State's highest court in 1991. -The New York Court
15. Id. preliminary statement. Note that the New York State Appellate
Divisions have adopted only the Disciplinary Rules, and the present
publication of the Code in the Court Rules does not contain the Preamble, the
Preliminary Statement, the Canons or the Ethical Considerations. See N.Y.
JUD. LAw app. (McKiniley 1992) for full text and annotations.

16. Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: 7he 1990
Amendments to the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 18
URB. L.J. 283 (1990-91). "In the 1970 Code, DR 2-106(C)
prohibited a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a criminal case. EC 2-20
also warned against charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter.
Both ethics committees and courts, however, have treated the Ethical
Considerations as binding." Id. at 306.
FORDHAM

17. MODEL

CODE

OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBT$1r

preliminary

statement (explaining that the "Canons, Ethical Considerations, and
Disciplinary Rules... define the type of ethical conduct that the public bas a
right to expect not only of lawyers but also of their non-professional
employees and associates in all matters pertaining to professional
employment").
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of Appeals wrote that the New York Code must be a flexible
document, which provides attorneys with "proper ethical
18
guidelines" only.

Ill. MATTER OF HOLTZMAN
In In re Holtzman, 19 the New York Court of Appeals
addressed, inter alia, a vagueness challenge to that section of the
Code Holtzman was accused of violating, and the alleged lack of
guidance therein. 20 In relevant part, Holtzman argued that the
Code did not specifically prohibit her conduct, and that at the
time of the conduct she was not on notice that her conduct was in
1

2
violation of her ethical obligations.
Holtzman was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(6), now
DR 1-102(A)(8). 22 This Disciplinary Rule is one of the more
general ones, which Holtzman referred to as a "standardless
rule." 23 The Disciplinary Rule fell at the end of a list which set
forth specific types of conduct in which a lawyer should not
engage. DR 1-102(A)(6) then provided that: "A lawyer

18. In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 191, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33, 573
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (per curiam) (stating "[b]road standards governing
professional conduct are permissible and indeed often necessary"), cert.
denied, 112 S; Ct. 648 (1991).
19. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (per curiam), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991).
20. For a full examination of the Holtzman case, see David W. Wright, In
re Holtzman: Free Speech or ProfessionalMisconduct?, 9 ToUTRo L. REV. 587
(1993). "Ms. Holtzman asserted, without ever having seen the trial transcript,
that Judge... asked the rape victim to get down on her knees and reenact her
rape." Id. at 587. After being given a Letter of Reprimand, Ms. Holtzman
appealed to the New York Court of Appeals to vacate the letter, "claiming that
it was a violation of her right to free speech, and asserting that the disciplinary
rules under which she was charged were void for vagueness." Id. at 589
(citing Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41).
21. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
22. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.3(a)(8) (1994).
23. Brief for Appellant at 26, Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30,
573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). But cf. Ev Parte
Secombe, 19 How. 9, 14 (1856) (acknowledging near impossibility of defining
every attorney offense "with legal precision").
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shall... not [e]ngage in any other conduct that adversely
reflects upon the lawyer's fitness to practice law. "24
The court held in its per curiam opinion that Holtzman's
specific false statements regarding a sitting judge violated this
Rule. 2 5 The court said that broad professional standards are
permissible and often necessary, reasoning that "[rjather than an
absolute prohibition on broad standards, the guiding principle
must be whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code
and its ethical strictures, would have notice of what conduct is
proscribed. ' 26 The ethical strictures the court refers to are not
only the Ethical Considerations and the other supportive
regulations, but also those general ,precepts of ethics and
professionalism to which attorneys must conform. 2 7 The court
relied upon this to uphold the reprimand despite having the option
of disciplining her under the specific rule of DR 8-102(B) which
states, "[a] [l]awyer shall not knowingly make false accusations
against a judge or other adjudicatory officer." 2 8 Perhaps the
court did so to enable it to look not only at the falsity of the
29
statement, but to the recklessness with which it was made.

24. N.Y. CoMP. CoDEs R. & REGs. tit. 22, § 1200.3(a)(8).
25. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 191-92, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at
42 (stating that Holtzman's "release to the media of a false allegation of
specific wrongdoing, made without any support other than the interoffice
memoranda of a newly admitted trial assistant..." as "unwarranted and
unprofessional... ").
26. Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 191-93, 577 N.E.2d at 33-34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43 (holding
the Holtzman reprimand valid based upon her failure to take any of the
reasonable steps available, as suggested by her own staff, to check the veracity
of the allegations before publicizing them).
28. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, § 1200.43(b) (1990).
29. See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at
42 (finding petitioner "plainly on notice" that the release of information to the
press could subject her to disciplinary action, and she should have further
investigated the allegations before publicizing them).
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IV. BROAD V. SPECIFIC REGULATIONS
Foregoing a specific statutory scheme detailing what attorneys
can and cannot do, the drafters of the Code instead created a
device which contained particular rules as well as general
precepts to encourage attorneys to look to the accepted standards
within the legal community and to examine their own morals and
general sense of professionalism, before deciding what the
appropriate conduct is in a certain situation.
In the early days Judge Sharswood believed that a lawyer
needed to be shown only a glimmer of guidance where his ethical
obligations were concerned. He wrote that:
There are pitfalls and man-traps at every step, and the mere
youth, at the very outset of his career needs often the prudence
and self-denial, as well as the moral courage, which belongs
commonly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe
guide; the only torch to light his way amidst darkness and
obstruction. 30
The drafters of the 1887 Alabama Code understood that a
specific set of conclusive statutory rules would not serve the
profession well. The Preamble stated that rather than control via
"statutory rules and an authoritative code," an attorney's duty
must "be ascertained in view of the peculiar facts, in the light of
conscience, and the conduct of honorable and distinguished
duties
attorneys in similar cases, and by an analogy to the
' 31
enjoined by statute, and the rules of good neighborhood.
What is implicit in that language is that ethical regulations
require room for personal and community morals and standards
to operate. No mere set of statutes could possibly encompass all
that attorneys were required to do, or refrain from doing; even in
1887. Nor could specific statutes adapt to the constantly changing
face of the practice of law or the ingenuity of lawyers.
This understanding of the need for flexibility within the
regulatory scheme was included in the Canons of Ethics when
30. ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS preamble, app. F at 352 (1887).
31. Id.
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they were adopted in 1908. The Preamble to the 1908 Canons set
down that understanding as:
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize
all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or
in all the relations of professional life. The following canons of
ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a general
guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be
construed as a denial of the existence of others equally
imperative, though not specifically mentioned. 32
The creators of the Canons plainly acknowledged not only that
a general set of guidelines was preferable, but also that lawyers
must be made to understand that the inclusion of certain specifics
does not preclude disciplinary action for conduct similar in scope
but not included as a specific misdeed. Rather than creating
"loopholes" through which attorneys could slip unprofessional
yet unenumerated conduct, this scheme encouraged ethical
conduct by nudging inquiring attorneys down an ethical corridor
which they themselves shaped through the factoring in of their
own moral and ethical beliefs and by considering the accepted
standards of conduct within the legal community. However, times
change, and the specific rule of law slowly crept into the
regulatory arena.
In 1934 Judge Harlan Fiske Stone (later Chief Justice)
vocalized his belief that the Canons of Ethics alone and the
generalization of moral standards that they represented, were
incapable of meeting the needs of the bar and the public in the
then modern era. 33
Before [the bar] can function at all as a guardian of the public
interests committed to its care, there must be appraisal and
comprehension of the new conditions, and the changed
relationships of the lawyer to his clients, to his professional

32. DRINKER, supra note 3.
33. Harlan F. Stone, The PublicInfluence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1934) (referring to Judge Stone's address at the Dedication of the University
of Michigan Law Quadrangle June 15, 1934).
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brethren and to the public.... Our canons of ethics for the most

34
part are generalizations designed for an earlier era.
Today, commentators, continuing in that vein, have found
problems with the present attorney regulatory codes, which
remain to a large degree collections of exhoratory ideals set forth
as general tenets. The complaints include: selective
discretion; 36 and
enforcement; 3 5 too much inherent prosecutorial
37
insufficient specific guidance or notice.
What these criticisms fail to acknowledge is that the present
codes are not statutes, were never intended to be such, and
therefore do not enumerate required elements as a statute is
required to do. In Niesig v. Team i, 38 Judge Kaye (now Chief
Judge) referring to the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility said: "The disciplinary rules have a different
provenance and purpose [from statutes].... [T]he Code of
Professional Responsibility is essentially the legal profession's
document of self-governance, embodying principles of ethical
conduct for attorneys as well as rules for professional
discipline .... 3 9 The court's discussion of such a broad notion
as "general principles" when discussing a regulatory scheme
clearly accents the different "provenance and purpose" of the
Code and the court's acceptance and approval of that
difference. 40 The New York Code was never intended to be a
statutory scheme, nor could it function as such because it could
never anticipate each and every conceivable legal ethical
situation.

34. Id. at 10.
35. Mark Aultman, Moral Characterand ProfessionalRegulation, 8 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 111-12 (1994).
36. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 801, 805 n.19 (1992).
37. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
Rnv. 1083, 1132 (1988).
38. 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990).
39. Id. at 369, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (citations
omitted).
40. Id. at 369-70, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/4

10

McDonough and Epstein: Attorney Conduct

19951

ATTORNEY CONDUCT

619

V. LAW AS A DISTINCT SOCIETY
As Judge Kaye recognized, the Code comes from a different
place and serves a different community than is served by most
statutory schemes. 4 1 The community the Code serves is
composed of individuals of comparable education and experience.
Lawyers, because of their training and experience, are and should
be held to a higher standard of conduct than, for example, the
average criminal who is subject to regulation by specific criminal
law statutes.
A lawyer under a broad regulatory scheme is encouraged by
that breadth of rule to examine factors other than the strict
interpretation of the language of the rule encompassing the
situation. Paramount among these extra-regulatory factors is an
examination of what a reasonable attorney would do under
similar circumstances. Thus, in Holtznan, the court upheld a
letter of reprimand to District Attorney Holtzman because she
knew or should have known that releasing unsubstantiated
charges against a sitting trial judge to the media without making a
reasonable attempt to ascertain their proof, was "unwarranted and
unprofessional, [and] serve[d] to bring the Bench and Bar into
disrepute, and.., to undermine public confidence in the judicial
system. "42
If, however, a specific statutory scheme were in effect, a
lawyer examining his conduct in the face of such a scheme could,
once he had examined the specific rules and found them silent as
to his proposed conduct, go forth with the belief that he was
within the spirit of the code; even where reasonable members of
the legal community might find the conduct improper. Moreover,
if the specific scheme did not prohibit the conduct in question,
yet purported to be the entire regulation, then there would be no

41. Id. (stating that statutes are-enacted by the legislature and are binding,
whereas, the Code is "the legal profession's document of self-governance"
which is respected by the courts but does not have the force of law).
42. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42
(citations omitted).
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duty upon the inquiring lawyer to look further - even into his
own conscience.
A specific statutory scheme could remove reasonable attorney
standards, individual beliefs, community practice standards, and
professional conscience from consideration by an attorney
researching his ethical obligations. Conversely, where there is a
broad regulatory scheme there is flexibility and room, not only
for individual morals and beliefs to be considered, but also for
consideration of the accepted standards of the local legal
community.
One of the most common complaints against general regulatory
schemes is that the rules are too vague to put the honest inquiring
member on notice that his conduct is inappropriate. 43 The United
States Supreme Court case of Parkerv. Levy 44 is instructive. The
Court there was faced with a vagueness challenge to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. Specifically at issue was section 133
which provides punishment for "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman." 45 Clearly, this standard is more general and
less specific in its requirements than most of the Rules within the
New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court, however, noted that because a different society was served
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, section 133 was
sufficient to give a member of that society notice of conduct
which would be proscribed. 4 6 The Court reasoned that due to the
differences between military and civilian society and law, and
due to the fact that the Military Code regulates a far greater range
of conduct than civilian law, the members of that society could
be held to a stricter standard through a more general set of
regulations. 47

43. DRINKER, supra note 3.
44. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

45. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1956). Section 933 provides in pertinent part: "Any
commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen shall be punished as a court martial
may direct." Id.
46. Parker,417 U.S. at 756-57.
47. Id. at 750.
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VI. RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Just as the national trend in attorney ethical regulation is toward
increasing specificity, so too is the regulation of professional
conduct in federal civil practice via monetary sanctions.
Since its inception, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has provided for the imposition of sanctions in an
attempt to curb abuses in litigation by providing for the payment
of costs and fees. 4 8 However, prior to the 1983 amendments to
that rule, it was largely ineffective. 4 9 Specifically, confusion
existed in the areas of "(1) the circumstances that should trigger
striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the
standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and
motions and (3) the range of available and appropriate
sanctions." 50 Originally, the Rule required pleadings or motions
to be based upon "good ground to support." 51 The 1983
amendments imposed the more stringent reasonableness standard
which, it was anticipated, would result in a greater range of
circumstances triggering a violation. 52 Thus, it was hoped that
increased control of lawyer conduct would result.
Between 1983 and 1990, Rule 11 as amended generated well
over one thousand judicial opinions and a growing number of
articles that fiercely debated its advantages and disadvantages. 53
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides, in relevant part: "If warranted,
the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable
expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion."
Id.
49. 5A CHARLms A. WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MIuER, FEtDERAL
PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334 (2d ed. 1990).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (citing Rodes, Ripple
and Mooney, Sanctions Imposablefor Violations of the FederalRldes of Civil
Procedure, Federal Judicial Center 64-65. (1981)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980)).
53. See Cary J. Coglianese, Insuring Rle 11 Sanctions, 88 MIcE. L.
REv. 344 (1989); Christopher A. Considine, Rule 11: Confl'cting Appellate
Standardsof Review and a ProposedUniform Approacli, 75 CORNEL L. REV.
727 (1990); Paul Kaufinan, A Prospective Cap on Rule 11 Sanctions, 56
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To say the least, the 1983 amendments have opened the door to a
flood of satellite litigation. While the amendments were intended
to increase the availability and imposition of sanctions aimed at
controlling attorney professional conduct, they were not intended
to increase the already strained federal court calendars. Rule 11
has essentially been used "as a weapon against other lawyers,
especially against civil rights plaintiffs or lawyers for the
poor." 54 Thus, a rule that was originally intended to prevent the
filing and arguing of frivolous matters "[had] become a tool of
55
harassment," which is clearly contrary to its intent.
As a result of this unintentional by-product, further
amendments were made in 1993 which were intended to remedy
problems that arose in the interpretation and application of Rule
11 after the 1983 amendments. The 1993 amendments were, in
essence, intended to stem the tide of satellite litigation. 5 6 The
drafters chose to do this via more specific regulation. However,
because Rule 11 is the first and last word on the subject, the
probable result is that the increased specificity of Rule 11 will
work against the intended result.
VII. WHY SPECIFIC ATTORNEY REGULATORY
SCHEMES ARE SUSPECT
The attempt to regulate solely by an antiseptic rule which limits
the factors an attorney has to look at in making a decision as to
how he must act, creates the opportunity for that attorney to
approach ethical questions narrowly. Instead of looking at an
ethical situation after examining not only his personal and
BROOK. L. REV. 1275 (1991); Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule
to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV.

11 as a Tool
793 (1991);

Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., The Use and Impact Of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 943 (1992); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the ChancellorShot Himself in the
Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
383 (1990).
54. Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETfIics
219 (1995) (citing Wilkins, supra note 36, at 838-40).

55. Id. at 241.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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professional conscience but also the general tenets and goals of
his profession and the prevailing view of his fellow professionals,
an attorney's inquiry may be limited to the letter of the rule. The
inquiring attorney may then take advantage of any loophole or
softness existing in the applicable statute - for this is what we are
trained to do, and faced with a specific rule this is what we will
do until the window of opportunity is closed.
This, at least to the authors of this article, appears to
demonstrate the problem with most specific regulatory schemes
which fail to require that individual and community morals and
immutable ethical tenets be a part of every attorney regulatory
analysis. That is, where a rule of conduct rests solely upon words
set down as a specific regulation with no requirement that the
inquiring attorney look to those "other" more general factors of
attorney ethics (discussed previously), attorneys will seek the soft
underbelly of the regulation; and where you try to regulate the
conduct of attorneys through specific statutory regulations, the
scope of possible situations attorneys are involved in is so vast
that it is impossible to anticipate all such circumstances. Thus,
there will always be loopholes and soft spots for attorneys to
"test."
VIII. CODE AS HYBRID
The New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility
in its present state is neither strictly statutory nor exhoratory. The
modem New York Code is actually a hybrid, neatly balancing
both the specific rule and the general ideal. While the Code
certainly has become more specific of late, it is notable that the
addition of specific rules of conduct has not resulted in the
overruling or removing of those general ideals remaining from its
nascency.
Overall, the recent adoption of specific Disciplinary Rules by
the four Appellate Divisions is not meant to impact the existing
general ideals represented in the Code; but is instead aimed at
rectifying very narrow bands of conduct needing specific
correction, or to address an area of practice truly ministerial or
uncomplicated. One example of the need for correction is the
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1993 amendments to the New York Code impacting the
matrimonial practice. 57 The matrimonial amendments were the
direct result of the "troubling atmosphere" surrounding the
matrimonial practice. 58 One example of the utilization of specific
regulation over ministerial areas of practice is the recent inclusion
of the rules on advertising in the Code. 59 The advertising rules
are mostly ministerial, and cover such areas as filing
requirements, 60 fee information, 6 1 and required content. 62
However, even with such straight-forward rules, the Code
continues to contain overriding general guidelines which require
the exercise of individual research and inquiry to arrive at a
proper course of conduct. The courts have wisely refrained from
eliminating the need to exercise individual ethics entirely, and
where the rule is not simply a housekeeping one, the attorney
63
must still conform his conduct to general guidelines.
57. Some of the new matrimonial rules include mandatory fee arbitration
and fee retainer agreements, the prohibition of non-refundable retainers,
prohibition of sexual relations between attorney and client during the course of
representation, and an inclusive statement of client rights. See Edward A.
Adams, Divorce Law Reforms Unveiled; Changes Affect Fees, Handling of
Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 17, 1993, at 1; Joel R. Brandes and Carole L.
Weidman, Regulation and the Conduct of Divorce Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
22, 1994, at 3; Judith S. Kaye, Chief Administrative Judge Orders
Amendments, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 4; Chris G. McDonough, Fee
Agreements, Security and Collection, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 1993, at 1.
58. See Report of the Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in
MatrimonialActions, May 1993, at 1; Women in Divorce: Lawyers, Ethics,
Fees and Fairness,N.Y. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFF., Mar. 1992.
59. Prior to 1990, the rules on attorney advertising were within each
Appellate Division's Court Rules. By Order of April 5, 1990, the Appellate
Divisions jointly adopted all the Disciplinary Rules of the Lawyer's Code of
Professional Responsibility as the minimum standards of conduct for all
attorneys, effective as of September 1, 1990. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs.
tit. 22, § 1200.
60. N.Y. COMp'. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 12.00.6(f)(1).
61. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 22, § 1200.06(c), (e), (g), (h),
and (i).
62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.6(k).
63. For example, while many of the advertising rules under Canon Two
are specific, general tenets must still be included and factored into attorney
ethical analysis. Before getting into the ministerial advertising rules, Canon
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In his article, Moral Characterand ProfessionalRegulation,64
Mark Aultman, in analyzing the modern codes including those of
other states and the ABA Model Code, draws a very bright line
between general rules requiring moral input and those seemingly
uncomplicated .ethical matters which can be controlled by the
mechanical application of specific statutes. 6 5 That distinction is,
6
and appropriately so, not so neat or simple in New York. 6
IX. THE 1990 AMENDMENT TO THE PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT
In 1990 the New York Code was amended, and certain
language was added to the existing Preliminary Statement:
No codification of principles can expressly cover all situations
that may arise. Accordingly, conduct that does not appear to
violate the express terms of any Disciplinary Rule nevertheless
may be found by an enforcing agency to be the subject of
Two, § 1200.6 [DR 2-101] starts off with the general admonition: "A lawyer
on behalf of himself or herself or partner or associates, shall not use or
disseminate or participate in the preparation or dissemination of any public
communication containing statements that are false, deceptive, misleading or
cast reflection on the legal profession as a whole." Id. See also § 1200.6b)
and (d).
64. 8 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHIcs 103 (1994).
65. Id. at 104 (stating that the confusion of disciplinary regulation of
administrative matters with those requiring moral input has damaged the legal
profession and society at large).
66. New York has, while adding more and more specific regulations,
continued to require that an attorney look to his own ethics and those of the
legal community before making almost every ethical decision - being guided
by the Code rather than Iocked in by it. To continue our advertising analogy,
there can be little doubt that the Appellate Divisions found that while most of
the rules on advertising could be set down with specificity as they required
little or no insight, there was the need to retain general guidelines dictating
that advertising by attorneys be honest, above-board, and professional (DR 2101 (A)and(B)). To try to express those simply stated yet far reaching
sentiments in a specific set of statutes, would be quite impossible. Yet, an
advertisement which violated, for example, the requirement that an
advertisement not cast reflection on the legal profession as a whole, would be
one that the vast majority of attorneys would recognize and agree on.
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discipline on the basis of a general principle illustrated by a
Disciplinary Rule or on the basis of an accepted common law
principle applicable to lawyers. 67
Remarkably, this language very closely parallels the Preamble of
the original ABA Canons of Ethics, adopted back in 1908.
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize
all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litig4tion or
in all the relations of professional life. The following canons of
ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a general
guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be
construed as a denial of the existence of others equally
68
imperative, though not specifically mentioned.
In connection with this addition, The Jones Committee Source
Notes indicate that the added language "represents a committee
improvement to clarify that, beyond the express terms of the
Disciplinary Rules, attorneys may be subject to discipline for
violation of a general principle illustrated by a Disciplinary Rule
or based on accepted common law principles applicable to
lawyers. " 69
The 1990 amendment to the Preliminary Statement did not
actually change anything. As the Jones Committee noted, the
added language merely "clarified" what had been accepted since
1908, and even before - that attorneys are held accountable not
only to specific regulations, but also to general immutable
principles of ethical conduct.
CONCLUSION

"There is a place [in attorney regulation] for both specific and
generalized" rule making dependent upon the purpose of the
67. N.Y. JUD. LAW app., preliminary statement (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1995).
68. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETfics (1908). See DRINKER, supra
note 3.
69. See NEw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT OF THE LAWYER'S
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Oct. 5, 1987) (incorporating
amendments adopted by the House of Delegates April 11 and June 26-27,
1987); see also Gross, supra note 16, at 286 n.12.
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regulation. 7 0 Perhaps the best regulation will blend the general
and the specific ii such a way that the inquiring attorney will
initially be given a general overview of his obligations, followed
where appropriate by a partial list of the more apparent possible
violations of that general tenet. But by no means should that list
attempt to be exhaustive.
It is the belief of the authors that the current trend towards
hybridization in New York has and should continue to recognize
that despite the hue and cry for specificity within our Code, there
will always be a place for requiring an attorney to inquire not
only into the Code when researching an ethical problem, but also
into the common law, his .professional community, his
experience, his own morals, and 'his own sense of
professionalism.

70. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NoMEB DAME
L. REV. 223, 224 (1993). "The form of an appropriate rule should depend, in
part, on the precise purpose the rulemakers identify." Id. at 290.
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